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In the late 1990s, Senator Patrick Leahy authored a law prohibiting
security assistance to foreign military and police units that violate human
rights unless their country tries to bring the offenders to justice. The Law
aims to incentivize countries to bring human rights abusers to justice, but
has received mixed reviews about its effectiveness. This Essay assesses
the Law's effectiveness with an empirical analysis, which presents novel
evidence the Law may serve its purpose. These results also challenge
prior empirical research on U.S. foreign aid and human rights.
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I. INTRODUCTION
As a matter of law, promoting human rights is U.S. foreign policy.'
The U.S. Government can erode human rights, however, by providing
military aid to oppressive regimes. Congress tried to address this
conundrum in the 1970s by amending the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA)
to bar the Department of State (DoS) from providing military aid to any
state engaged in "a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally
2
recognized human rights."
The DoS has resisted the implementation of this law because it is
overly broad. 3 Thus, in 1998, Senator Patrick Leahy authored a law more
narrowly tailored to the issue. This new law, hereinafter referred to as the
"DoS Leahy Law," prohibits the DoS from providing military aid to
military and police units with personnel suspected to have committed
gross violations of human rights unless their state takes effective
measures to bring them to justice. 4 The next year, Congress passed a
similar law prohibiting the Department of Defense (DoD) from providing
training to foreign military or police units suspected to have committed
gross violations of human rights unless the state removes the offenders
from the unit.5 Together, these laws have become known as the Leahy
6
Laws.
According to Senator Leahy, the Leahy Laws serve to reduce U.S.
complicity in human rights abuses.7 The DoS Leahy Law, however,
serves an additional purpose: to incentivize countries to bring human
rights abusers to justice.8 This additional purpose forms the question this
Essay seeks to answer: Does the DoS Leahy Law incentivize countries to
bring human rights abusers to justice? Critics have answered in the
negative, arguing the law is ineffective because the U.S. Government
does not enforce it. 9 Yet, there are reports of the DoS suspending aid to
I. See 22 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(1) (2014).
2. International Security Assistance Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-384, sec. 6(d)(1).
3. NINA M. SERAFINO ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43361, "LEAHY LAW" HUMAN
RIGHTS PROVISIONS AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE: ISSUE OVERvIEw 3 (2014); see also Stephen B.
Cohen, ConditioningU.S. SecurityAssistance on Human Rights Practices,76 AM. J. INT'L L. 246,
248-49 (1982).
4. See 22 U.S.C. § 2378d(a)-(b) (2014).
5. See Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-262, Sec. 8130
(1999).
6. SERAFINO ET AL., supra note 3, at 1.
7. 160 CONG. REC. S4452 (daily ed. July 14, 2014) (statement of Sen. Leahy) [hereinafter
Hearings].
8. Id.
9. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE "SIXTH DIVISION": MILITARY-PARAMILITARY TIES
AND U.S. POLICY INCOLOMBIA 84-106 (2001); see also John Barry, From Drug War to Dirty War:

'PlanColombia' and the U.S. Role in Human Rights Violations in Colombia, 12 TRANSNAT'L L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 186 (2002); Nathanael Tenorio Miller, The Leahy Law: Congressional
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military units under the law.1° To date, no empirical research has
addressed this question. Using a difference-in-differences analysis, this
Essay provides novel empirical evidence that the DoS Leahy Law may
indeed incentivize countries to bring human rights abusers to justice.
Furthermore, the results of this Essay challenge prior empirical research
on the impact of concessionary U.S. foreign aid on human rights.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Leahy Laws
Security assistance is a series of statutory authorizations and annual
appropriations the DoS uses to provide military aid to foreign
governments. 11 For example, under the Foreign Military Financing
Authorization and Annual Appropriation, the DoS may provide grants
and loans to foreign militaries so they may purchase weapons and
equipment from defense contractors.' 2 Another example is the
International Military Education and Training Authorization and Annual
Appropriation, which funds U.S. military training and education for
select foreign military leaders.13
The DoS Leahy Law prohibits the DoS from providing security
assistance to foreign security forces units (or individuals) suspected to
have committed a gross violation of human rights. 14 The FAA defines
gross violations of human rights as torture; cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment; prolonged detention without charges and trial;
causing the disappearance of persons by the abduction and clandestine
detention of those persons; and other flagrant denial of the right to life,

Failure,Executive Overreach,and the Consequences, 45 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 667, 670 (2012).
10. Human Rights in Bangladesh:HearingBefore Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission
House of Representatives, 112th Cong. 7 (2012) (statement of Robert 0. Blake, Jr., Asst. Sec.,
Bureau of South and Central Affairs, U.S. Dept. State); Charles "Ken" Comer, Leahy in
Indonesia: Damned if You Do (and Even if You Don't), 37 ASIAN AlT. AM. REv. 53, 63 (2010);
Matthew Lee, U.S. Plans to Boost Aid to Pakistan by $2 Billion, CNSNEWS.COM (Oct. 22, 2010,
2
https://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/us-plans-boost-military-aid-pakistan- AM),
7:16
billion; Stanley Opeyemi, Nigeria Callsfor a Re-Think of the Leahy Law, TIHE HILL (Feb. 5,2015,
6:00 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/231778-nigeria-calls-for-a-rethink-of-the-leahy-law.
11. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. §§ 2311-2323, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2347-2347h, 22 U.S.C. §§ 23482348d; Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235, 128
Stat. 2594.
12.

See DEFENSE INSTITUTE OF SECURITY COOPERATION STUDIES, THE MANAGEMENT OF

SECURITY COOPERATION 1-2 (2016).

13.
14.

See id. at 1-4.
See 22 U.S.C.

§ 2378d(a) (2014).
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liberty, or the security of person.15
When the DoS Leahy Law requires barring security assistance to a
specific unit or individual, the DoS must notify the foreign government
of the bar and assist that government in taking effective measures to bring
the offender(s) to justice. 16 This is known as the "duty to inform"
requirement. 17 Effective measures can be a credible investigation
followed by appropriate disciplinary action or impartial prosecution in
accordance with local law.18 Lastly, the DoS does not have to bar security
assistance under the Law if the country responsible for a unit or individual
suspected to have committed a gross violation of 9human rights takes
effective measures to bring the offenders to justice.'
Since its inception in 1998 until 2014, the DoD Leahy Law only
prohibited the DoD from using appropriations to fund the training of
foreign security forces units suspected to have committed gross violations
of human rights. 20 In 2014, Congress expanded the Law to prohibit the
DoD from using appropriations to provide any type of assistance, to
include the provision of weapons and equipment, to foreign security
forces units suspected to have committed gross violations of human
rights. 2 'Under the DoD Leahy Law, the Secretary of Defense may waive
this prohibition if the country responsible for the unit takes "all necessary
corrective measures." 22 "Corrective measures" may simply involve
15. 22 U.S.C. § 2304(d)(1) (2014).
16. 22 U.S.C. § 2378d(c) (2014); see also Office of the Secretary of State, Delegation of
Authority 229, 64 Fed. Reg. 17208 (Apr. 8, 1999).
17. See SERAFINO ET AL., supra note 3, at 5.
18. H.R REP. No. 105-401, at 91 (1997).
19. 22 U.S.C. § 2378d(b) (2014); Office of the Secretary of State, supra note 16.
20. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76, Sec. 8057(a);
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-76, Sec. 8058(a); Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74, Sec. 8057(a); Department of Defense and FullYear Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-10, Sec. 8058(a); Department of
Defense Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-118, Sec. 8061(a); Consolidated Security,
Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 110-329, Sec.
8061(a); Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-1 16, Sec. 8062(a);
Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-289, Sec. 8060(a); Department
of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of
Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-148, Sec. 8069(a); Department of
Defense Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-287, Sec. 8076(a); Department of Defense
Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-87, Sec. 8077(a); Department of Defense
Appropriations Act, 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-248, Sec. 8080(a); Department of Defense and
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Recovery from Response to Terrorist Attacks on the
United States Act, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-117, Sec. 8093(a); Department of Defense
Appropriations Act, 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-259, Sec. 8090(a); Department of Defense
Appropriations Act, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-79, Sec. 8098(a); Department of Defense
Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-262, Sec. 8130(a).
21. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76, Sec. 8057(a).
22. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-866, HUMAN RIGHTS: ADDITIONAL
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23
removing the suspected offender(s) from the unit.

B. Vetting
Prior to receiving security assistance, the DoS vets foreign security
force units or individuals to determine whether there is credible
information that a member, or members, of the unit committed a gross
violation of human rights.24 Vetting starts at the embassy located in the
recipient unit's country. 25 Once an embassy selects a unit or individual to
receive security assistance, embassy personnel check a number of
unclassified and classified sources for derogatory information.26 Sources
include reports and databases from local governments, the U.S.
Government, and Non-Governmental Organizations, such as Human
Rights Watch.27 If the embassy does not find credible information of a
gross violation of human rights, the unit or individual faces further vetting
at the DoS headquarters.2 8
At the DoS headquarters, the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights,
and Labor (DRL) and regional bureaus conduct further investigation into
whether any derogatory information exists.29 If both the DRL and
regional bureaus determine no derogatory information exists, the unit or
individual is eligible for security assistance. 31 If further review is
a team of DoS officials to evaluate any
required, the DRL will assemble
31
derogatory information.
C. The Debate
According to Senator Leahy, the DoS Leahy Law serves two
purposes: (1) to reduce U.S. complicity in human rights abuses and (2) to
incentivize countries to bring human rights abusers to justice. 32 There is
a debate on the laws' effectiveness, which begs the question as to whether
the law can incentivize countries to bring human rights offenders to
justice.
Critics believe the law is ineffective for numerous reasons, most
GUIDANCE, MONfFORING, AND TRAINING, COULD IMPROVE IMPLEMENTATION OF LEAHY LAWS 6-7

(2013).
23.
24.

Id. at 7.
SERAF[NO ET AL., supra note 3, at 7.

25.

Id. at9.

26.
27.

Id. at 10; see also 22 U.S.C. § 2378d(d)(3)(2016).
SERAF INO ET AL., supra note 3, at 10.

28.

Id.

29.

Id.

30.

Id.

31.
32.

Id.
Hearings,supra note 7.
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notable, however, is a lack of executive enforcement. Human Rights
Watch (2001) has argued the DoS will outright violate the law if a unit is
important enough for U.S. strategic objectives.33 For example, the DoS
continued to provide security assistance to Colombia's Combat Air
Command No. 1, despite the unit receiving numerous credible human
rights abuse allegations. 34 Combat Air Command No. 1 is a Colombian
35
aviation unit thought to be crucial to the War on Drugs.
Miller provided numerous examples of the DoS and DoD
circumventing the Leahy Laws in Afghanistan, Colombia, and the
Philippines and argued that the President will not fully implement the
Law because it intrudes on the Executive branch's effort to achieve
primacy in foreign affairs. 36 Miller supported his argument by showing
the Executive branch's circumvention of the Leahy Laws is just part of a
trend, which started with the War Powers Act, of the Executive branch
pushing back against Congressional attempts to check presidential
power.37 Furthermore, Miller argued that Congress has acquiesced to this
trend and the judiciary has enacted barriers to litigating foreign policy
statutes such as the Leahy Laws. 38 In sum, Miller argues there is little
39
stopping the Executive branch from ignoring the Leahy Laws.
To counter those who argue the Law is not enforced, Congress is not
powerless with respect to controlling the Executive branch. Congress can
investigate the Executive branch with its oversight role 40 and coerce the
Executive branch through a law known as the Antideficiency Act.41 This
Act prohibits the unauthorized use of appropriations and can result in
criminal or administrative sanctions for federal employees. 42 Because
security assistance is tied to appropriations, a violation of the DoS Leahy
Law may amount to an Antideficiency Act violation. Senior military
officers are well aware of the consequences an Antideficiency Act
violation may have on their careers 43 and it is equally likely senior
33.

HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 9, at 96-100.

34.
35.

Id.
Id.

36.
37.

Miller, supra note 9, at 674-92.
Id. at 688-89.

38.
39.

Id. at 689-94.
Id. at 694.

40.

See generally FREDERICK

M.

KAISER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CONGRESSIONAL

OVERSiGHT (2001).
41. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 1341-42, 1511-19.

42. Spending appropriated funds in a manner prohibited by law violates the Antideficiency
Act. See 31 U.S.C. § 1301(a); see also Presidio Trust, B-306424, Comp. Gen. (2006); see 31
U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1)(A); To the Hon. BillAlexander, 63 Comptroller Gen. 422 (1984); 31 U.S.C.
§ 1349(a) (Federal employees who [unintentionally and unknowingly] violate the Antideficiency
Act may still face administrative discipline); 31 U.S.C. § 1350 (Federal employees who
knowingly and intentionally violate the Antideficiency Act may face criminal charges).
43. See Russell R. Henry, Keep Your Commanders off the Fiscal Naughty List-How to
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diplomats are aware of the consequences as well. Accordingly, there are
reports that the DoS denied military assistance to units in Indonesia,
Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Nigeria under the Leahy Laws. an Furthermore,
former Senior Advisor for the DoS's Bureau of South Asian Affairs,
Stephen Rickhard, testified to Congress that some countries have been
units denied security assistance to regain eligibility
able to rehabilitate
45
under the Law.
The debate on the Leahy Law ties into the greater debate on whether
the U.S. foreign aid influences recipient countries to support U.S. foreign
policy objectives. Overall, the empirical literature provides mixed results.
On one hand, a body of literature has found that U.S. foreign aid may
influence other countries to cast votes at the U.N. General Assembly in
support of U.S. positions. 46 On the other hand, there is a body of literature
that has found counter intuitive results.47 In particular, some of this
literature suggests that U.S. foreign aid has either no or a negative impact
on human rights.For instance, Regan found the provision of U.S.
economic aid is not associated with an improvement in human rights
within the recipient country.48 More recently, Sandholtz found the
provision of U.S. military assistance is associated49 with a decrease in
human rights conditions within a recipient country.
III. ARMS FOR INFLUENCE THEORY
To assess the merit of the positions taken in the debate, the arms for
influence theory must be considered in the context of the DoS Leahy
Law. This theory holds that military aid is a source of bargaining power
and that powerful countries use it to encourage recipients to behave in a

Spot and Prevent Common Antideficiency Act Violations, 2016 ARMY LAW. 24, 16 (Jan. 2016).

44.

Comer, supra note 10.

45. Hearings,supra note 7, at S4453.
46. Bruce Moon, The ForeignPolicy of the Dependent State, 27 INT'L STUD. Q.315 (1983),
reviewed by Patricia L. Sullivan et al., US. Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation, 7
FOREIGN POL'Y ANALYSIS 275, 278(2011); T.Y. Wang, U.S. ForeignAid and U.N. Voting: An
Analysis of importantIssues, 43 INT'L STUD. Q. 199 (1999), reviewed by Sullivan et al., supra, at
278; Brian Lai et al., Impact of Regime Type on the Influence of US. ForeignAid, 2 FOREIGN
POL'Y ANALYSIS 385 (2006), reviewed by Sullivan et al., supra, at 278.
47. Wayne Sandholtz, UnitedStates Military Assistance andHuman Rights, 38 HuM. RTS.
Q. 1070, 1072 (2016); Sullivan et al., supra note 46, at 275; Patrick Regan, U.S. Economic Aid
andPoliticalRepression: An EmpiricalEvaluation of US. Foreign Policy, 48 POL. RES. Q. 613,
614 (1995); Charles W. Kegley & Steven W. Hook, U.S. Foreign Aid and UN. Voting: Did
Reagan's Linkage Strategy Buy Defense or Defiance?, 35 INT'L STUD. Q 295 (1991), reviewed
by Sullivan et al., supra note 46, at 279.
48. Regan, supra note 47, at 614.
49. Sandholtz, supra note 47, at 1072.
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desirable manner. 50 In other words, countries can take a carrot and stick
approach with military aid to secure cooperation with the recipient
country. The DoS Leahy Law codifies this theory into law by prohibiting
security assistance for units that engage in gross violations of human
rights unless they take effective measures to bring the offenders to
justice. 51 Thus, the more a country depends on security assistance, the
greater incentive the Law provides to prosecute human rights violations
to rehabilitate units denied security assistance or to proactively secure
security assistance for units in the future. Nonetheless, the Law can only
incentivize countries that receive security assistance if it is enforced.
Therefore, if the Executive branch enforces the Law and the arms for
influence theory is valid, then the following hypothesis should hold true:
The more countries depend on security assistance after the enactment of
the DoS Leahy Law, the more human rights violations they will prosecute
in the future.
IV. EMPIuCAL DESIGN
A. Data
A multivariate analysis with country-specific panel data from 1990 to
2010 was used to test the hypothesis stated immediately above. The data
starts at 1990 because this year coincides with the fall of the Soviet Union
and a shift in U.S. strategic priorities. 52 The data ends at 2010 because
this was the latest year that provides the most complete information
throughout the underlying data.
The observations underlying the data are nation states, specifically,
states that are members of the United Nations or receiving assistance
from the U.S. Government. 53 The sources of the data are: Transitional
Justice Research Collaborative; USAID's annual publication on U.S.
Overseas Loans and Grants ("Greenbook"); Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI); the World Bank; the Political Terror
Scale; Major Episodes of Political Violence; the Polity IV Project; and
Professors Drew A. Linzer and Jeffrey K. Staton.

50.
51.

See Sullivan et al., supra note 46, at 279.
22 U.S.C. § 2378d(a)-(b)(2014).

52.

THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES (1991).

53.

See SIKKINK ET AL., TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE RESEARCH COLLABORATIVE, HUMAN
RIGHTS PROSECUTIONS CODING MANUAL 3 (2014), https://transitionaljusticedata.com/files/Trials

%20Coding%20Manual.pdf (last visited Jan. 4, 2017) [hereinafter TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
RESEARCH COLLABORATIVE].
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B. Variables
1. Dependent Variable-State Human Rights Prosecutions
This variable is count data on human rights prosecutorial actions taken
by a state per year. A state received a "0" for a year in which it did not
take any prosecutorial activity. Otherwise, a state received a numerical
value per year equal to the number of prosecutorial actions taken
annually. This54 data comes from the Transitional Justice Research
Collaborative.

Under this variable, a prosecutorial action is any of the following: an
indictment, an arrest, the execution of an arrest warrant, an extradition
request, an extradition, a detention, preliminary court hearings, or a
trial.55 These forms of prosecutorial activity are likely akin to a state
taking effective measures to bring a human rights abuser to justice under
the DoS Leahy Law. For the purposes of this variable, human rights
violations are state violations of physical or personal integrity rights and
include extrajudicial killings, torture, disappearances, and political
imprisonment.56 Such violations likely qualify as gross violations of
human rights under the DoS Leahy Law.
Table 1 reports basic descriptive statistics for this variable. Common
with count data, the dependent variable has more "Os" than any other
value. In other words, states rarely prosecute human rights violations.
From 1990 to 2010, states took an average of one prosecutorial action
with respect to human rights violations. Approximately 25% of all
observations in the data represent prosecutorial action for human rights
violations. The maximum number of human rights prosecutorial actions
taken by a country in a year was 31.
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Dependent Variable

Variable

N

Mean

Min

2 5 th

5

01h

7 5 th

Max

percentile percentile percentile

State Human Rights 3,955
Prosecutions

1.065

0

0

0

1

31

54. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE RESEARCH COLLABORATIVE, https://transitionaljusticedata.com/
(last visited Jan. 4, 2017).
55. Id. at 4-5.
56. Id. at 5-6.
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2. Independent Variables
a. Security Assistance Dependence
This variable represents the annual percentage of a country's military
budget that is made up of security assistance. This variable divides the
annual amount of security assistance (2014 U.S. dollars) provided to a
country by that country's annual defense budget plus the annual amount
of security assistance and DoD military aid received. For this variable,
security assistance is the dollar amount (in 2014 U.S. dollars) of security
assistance provided as military aid.57 DoD military aid is the dollar
amount (in 2014 dollars) of military aid the DoD provides to a country.
59
58
This data comes from USAID's Greenbook

and SIPRI.

b. Post Leahy Law Enactment
Since Congress enacted the DoS Leahy Law in 1998, this variable
characterizes the period of time before and after 1998. Thus, a "0" for this
variable represents the period of time before 1998 and a "1" for the period
of time after 1998. In other words, "0" represents years 1990 to 1997. A
"1" represents years 1998 to 2010.
3. Control Variables
The control variables come from prior empirical research involving
human rights prosecutions and state repression. Prior research has either
shown correlations between these variables and human rights
prosecutions or used these variables to control for country heterogeneity.
There are a total of nine control variables.
a. Neighboring Prosecutions
Human rights prosecutions may influence human rights prosecutions
in neighboring countries. 60 Thus, this variable controls for any effect
neighboring human rights prosecutions may have on the dependent
variable. This variable assigns a numeric value to each county by
57. This excludes security assistance provided as economic aid, which is less likely to be
received by a military or police force unit.
58.

U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL

DEVELOPMENT,
https://www.usaid.gov/data/dataset/49cOl 560-6cd7-4bbc-bfef-7a1991867633
(last visited Dec. 12, 2016).
59.

SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH

INSTITUTE, https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex (last visited Apr. 1, 2017).
60. See Geoff Dancy & Kathryn Sikkink, Ratification and Human Rights Prosecutions:
Toward a TransnationalTheory of Treaty Compliance, 44 INT'L L. & POL. 751, 790 (2012).
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subtracting the number of prosecutorial actions a country takes annually
from the total number of prosecutorial actions taken within its geographic
region, annually. This variable is lagged by one year because there may
be a delay from when a country prosecutes a human rights violation to
when a neighboring country decides to prosecute a human rights
violation. This6 1 data comes from the Transitional Justice Research
Collaborative.
b. Treaty Ratification
Prior research has shown that ratification of human rights treatiesspecifically treaties that protect physical integrity rights and contain
individual accountability provisions-are correlated with an increase in
human rights prosecutions. 62 This variable represents the percentage of
human rights treaties, which protect physical integrity rights and contain
individual accountability provisions, that a country ratifies. 63 Treaties
included in this variable are the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Genocide, the American Convention on Human Rights,
the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, and
Degrading Treatment, the Rome Statute for the International Criminal
on the Protection of All Persons from
Court, and the Convention
64
Disappearances.
Enforced
A country and year were coded "0" if a country did not ratify one of
the treaties above. 65 If a country did ratify one of the treaties above, the
year the country ratified the treaty was coded "1" as well as all following
years. 66 This step was performed for all treaties listed above applicable to
a given country. Last, the "Is" were added by country and year and
of human rights treaties listed above, available to
divided by the number
67
a country by year.
c. Conflict
This variable controls for the impact armed conflict may have on the
dependent variable because international and non-international armed
conflict may increase state repression, 68 which may increase human rights
61. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE RESEARCH COLLABORATIVE, supra note 53.
62. Dancy & Sikkink, supra note 60, at 769-75.
63. Id. at 770.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 769.
66. Id. at 771.
67. Id.
68. Hun Joon Kim & Kathryn Sikkink, How Do Human Rights Prosecutions Improve
Human Rights After Transition?, 7 INTERDISC. J. HUM. RTS. L. 69, 79-80 (2013).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2017

11

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 4
FLORIDA JOURNAL OFINTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 29

prosecutions. 69 This variable is a numeric scale with values that range
from 0-10, which measures the magnitude of internal and external
conflict a country experiences in a year. A value of "0" equates to there
being no internal or external conflict with a country during a year and a
value of "10" equates to the highest magnitude of internal and external
conflict a country can experience in a year. 70 Data for this variable came
from the Major Episodes of Political Violence Database. 7
d. Democracy
This variable controls for any effect a democratic government may
have on human rights prosecutions. Prior research has shown that
democratic countries are more likely to prosecute human rights violations
than autocracies. 7 2 Democratic countries also show less state
73
repression.
This variable is a scale that ranges from -10 to 10, where a value of
"10" equates to a fully-fledged democratic government and a "-10" is an
autocracy.7 4 A score of"0" is an equal mix of autocracy and democracy.7 5
76
Data for this variable came from the Polity IV Project.
e. Judicial Independence
This variable controls for any effect judicial independence may have
on the dependent variable because judicial independence has been shown
to be positively correlated with human rights prosecutions. 77 This
variable measures judicial independence by country per year. The
measure of judicial independence is a scale of 0 to 1, with a score of 1
equating to the most independent of judiciaries and a score of "0"
equating to no judicial independence.7 8 This data came from Professors

69. Dancy & Sikkink, supra note 60, at 790.
70. MONTY G. MARSHALL, CENTER FOR SYSTEMIC PEACE, MAJOR EPISODES OF POLITICAL
VIOLENCE (MEPV) AND CONFLICT REGIONS, 1946-2015, at 3-4 (2016), http://www.systemic
peace.org/inscr/MEPVcodebook2O15.pdf (last visited Jan. 4, 2017).
71. INSCR Data Page, CENTER FOR SYSTEMIC PEACE, http://www.systemicpeace.org/
inscrdata.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2017).
72. Dancy & Sikkink, supra note 60, at 790.
73. Kim & Sikkink, supra note 68, at 79-80.
74. MONTY G. MARSHALL ET AL., POLITY IV PROJECT, POLITICAL REGIME
CHARACTERISTICS AND TRANSITIONS, 1800-2015, at 14 (2016).
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. Dancy & Sikkink, supra note 60, at 790.
78. Drew A. Linzer & Jeffrey K. Staton, A Global Measure of JudicialIndependence, 3
EMORY J.L. & CTS. 223, 233 (2015).
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Drew A. Linzer and Jeffrey K. Staton.7 9
f. Political Terror Scale
The Political Terror Scale (PTS) is a 1-5 scale that measures state
repression, with a "1" being a state that respects human rights and a "5"
being a state that has no respect for human rights. 80 The PTS measures
human rights abuses committed by a state based on a coder's
interpretation of annual DoS82country reports on human rights.8 ' This data
came from the PTS Project.
g. Gross Domestic Product
This variable controls for country heterogeneity and measures the
total value of goods produced and services provided by country per year
to its natural
and per capita. In addition, this variable was converted
83
logarithm. This data came from the World Bank.
h. Population
This variable measures population by country and year and controls
for country heterogeneity. Additionally, this variable was converted to its
natural logarithm.The data for this variable came from the World Bank. 84
C. StatisticalModels
A difference-in-differences analysis was used to test the hypothesis
from Part 1I. Underlying the difference-in-differences analysis are three
conditional fixed effects Poisson regressions (Model I, Model 1I, and
Model III) with standard errors clustered by country. Poisson regressions
are appropriate because the dependent variable is count data. The fixed
effects control for any unobserved variables within a country that are
constant over time that may influence the dependent variable. Lastly, the
literature holds the conditional fixed effects model with clustered
79.

Id.; Jeffrey Staton, ReplicationDatafor: A Global Measure ofJudicial Independence,

1948-2012, JEFFREY STATON DATAVERSE, http://polisci.emory.edu/faculty/jkstato/page3/index.
html (last visited Jan. 4, 2017).
80.

See Documentation: Coding Rules, THE POLITICAL TERROR SCALE (Jan. 4, 2017),

http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/Data/Documentation.html.
81. See id.
82.

Download, THE POLITICAL TERROR SCALE (last visited Jan. 4, 2017), http://www.

politicalterrorscale.org/Data/Download.html.
83. World Bank Open Data, THE WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/ (last visited
Jan. 4, 2017).
84. Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2017

13

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 4
266

FLORIDA JOURNAL OFINTERNA IYONAL LA W

[Vol. 29

standard errors is robust to serial correlation and over dispersion.8 5 The
equation for Model I is:
State Human Rights Prosecutionsit = P3iln(Security Assistance
Dependenceit+.0001) + 02Post Leahy Law Enactmentt +
031n(Security Assistance Dependenceit+.0001)*Post Leahy Law
Enactmentt+ Xit +6Country + 6Year + Eit
State Human Rights Prosecutionsitrepresents the dependent variable:
the amount of human rights prosecutorial actions taken by a country,
labeled "i," during a year, labeled "t." Security Assistance Dependenceit
is the dollar value of security assistance the DoS provides to a country in
a given year. The coefficient for this variable, 1, is the estimated effect
security assistance has on the dependent variable without the enactment
of the DoS Leahy Law. Post Leahy Law Enactmentt represents a given
year following the passage of the DoS Leahy Law.Its coefficient, 132, is
the estimated effect that year following the enactment of the DoS Leahy
Law has on the dependent variable. The coefficient 03, is an interaction
term that estimates the effect security assistance has on the dependent
variable after the enactment of the DoS Leahy Law. Country represents
country fixed effects. 6Year represents annual fixed effects.11 is the error
term for the model. Xit represents the control variables. The equation for
Model II is:
State Human Rights Prosecutionsit = P3iln (Security Assistance
Dependenceit + .0001) + P2 Post Leahy Law Enactment + 1331n
(Security Assistance Dependenceit + .0001)*Post Leahy Law
Enactmentt + 134n(Security Assistance Dependenceit 1+ .000 1) +
035Post Leahy Law Enactmentt i + 1361n(Security Assistance
Dependenceit - i + .0001)*Post Leahy Law Enactmentt - I+Xit +
5Country + 6Year + Eit
Model II adds an interaction term between Security Assistance
Dependencei_ 1and Post Leahy Law Enactmentt 1 to the first model.
Security Assistance Dependenceit- 1 is a one year lag of the variable
Security Assistance Dependencei,. Its coefficient, 134, measures the same
effect as 1 but with a one year lag. Post Leahy Law Enactmentt- 1 is a
one year lag of the variable Post Leahy Law Enactmentt. Its coefficient,
35, estimates the same effect of 132, but with a one year lag. The one year
lags provide a time period between receipt of aid and the dependent
85. Poisson regressions assume the absence of serial correlation and over dispersion. The
conditional fixed effects Poisson regression with robust standard errors, however, accounts for
serial correlation and over dispersion. See Jeffrey Wooldridge, Distribution-FreeEstimation of
Some NonlinearPanelData Models, 90 J.ECONMET. 77, 78 (1999).
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variable to assess a causal relationship. Thus, the coefficient, 136, is an
interaction term that estimates the effect security assistance has, one year
after receipt, on the dependent variable during the period following the
enactment of the DoS Leahy Law. This Model also includes the
interaction term from Model I as a means to further control for serial
correlation.The equation for Model III is:
State Human Rights Prosecutionsit

3iln(Security Assistance

Dependenceit + 1) + 32Post Leahy Law Enactmentt + 133n(Security

Assistance Dependenceit + .0001) * Post Leahy Law Enactmentt +
134n(Security Assistance Dependenceit - + .000 1) + 135Post Leahy
Law Enactmentt - I + 136 n(Security Assistance Dependenceit 1+
.0001)*Post Leahy Law Enactmentt- i + 137n(Security Assistance
Dependenceit- 2 + .0001) + 138Post Leahy Law Enactmentt-2 + 1391n

(Security Assistance Dependenceit_ 2 + .0001)*Post Leahy Law
Enactmentt- 2 + Xit 6Country + 6Year + Fit
Building on the prior two models, Model III adds an interaction term
between Security Assistance Dependenceit - 2 and Post Leahy Law
Enactmentt - 2.Security Assistance Dependenceit- 2is a two year lag of the
variable Security Assistance Dependenceit. Its coefficient, 137, measures
the same effect as 13 but with a two year lag. Post Leahy Law
Enactmentt-2 is a two year lag of the variable Post Leahy Law
Enactmentt. Its coefficient, 138, represents the same effect of 132 but with a
two year lag. Like Model II, the two year lag provides a sufficient time
period between receipt of security assistance and the dependent variable
to infer a causal relationship. 86 Thus, the coefficient, 13, estimates the
effect security assistance has, two years after receipt, on the dependent
variable during the period following the enactment of the DoS Leahy
Law. This Model includes the coefficients from Models I and II to control
for serial correlation.
V.

RESULTS

Table 2 shows that after the enactment of the DoS Leahy Law, there
is a statistically significant increase in domestic human rights
prosecutorial actions two years after a country receives security
86. Any period beyond two years from the receipt of security assistance makes it more
difficult to infer a causal relationship with human rights prosecutions. Moreover, every year that
passes between a country's receipt of security assistance and a prosecution removes one year's
worth of data from the statistical models discussed below. In short, testing the effects of security
assistance on human rights prosecutions beyond two years reduces the statistical models' ability
to produce evidence of a causal relationship.
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assistance. Specifically, Model Ill shows that a small percentage
increase 87 in dependence on security assistance, after the enactment of
the DoS Leahy Law, results in a 9% increase in human rights
prosecutorial actions taken by a country two years after receiving aid.
Models I and II show no statistically significant relationship between the
independent variables and dependent variable.
The lack of a statistically significant relationship between the
dependent variable zero and one year after a country receives security
assistance following the enactment of the DoS Leahy Law may be
explained by the time required for diplomacy and investigation. If the
DoS Leahy Law prohibits assistance, the DoS must notify the foreign
government of the prohibition. Once notified, the country must decide
whether it wants to move forward without the DoS providing aid to the
unit in question or seek to rehabilitate the unit. If the country seeks
rehabilitation, they will likely conduct their own internal investigation
prior to initiating a prosecution. In sum, it is reasonable for a country to
take up to two years to initiate a human rights prosecution after being
notified of a suspected human rights violation.
Based on the number of human right prosecutions countries actually
pursue, the coefficient in Model III purports that the provision of security
assistance after the enactment of the Leahy Law has a small effect on
human rights prosecutions. In Part III, countries on average initiated
approximately one human rights prosecution over the entire span of the
dataset. Nonetheless, this small effect may be explained by the low
volume of units the DoS denies security assistance under the Leahy Laws.
From 2010 to 2013, out of 530,000 units vetted to receive security
assistance, the DoS barred aid to only 2,516 units under the Leahy
Laws. 88 Of this small cohort of units the DoS denies security assistance,
not all may be rehabilitated. Thus, the small effect the provision of
security assistance has on human rights prosecutions should be of no
surprise. In sum, the overall results of the difference-in-differences
analysis supports the main hypothesis of this Essay-The more countries
depend on security assistanceafter the enactment of the DoS Leahy Law,
the more human rights violations they will prosecute in the future.

87. A small percentage equates to a ten-thousandths of a percent increase in dependence
on security assistance because Security Assistance Dependence is converted to its natural
logarithm.
88.

Hearings,supra note 7, at S4452.
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Table 2: DoS Leahy Law and Human Rights Prosecutions
Independent
Variables

Model I

Model II

0.089*

Securitv

Assistance*Post
Leahy Law
Enactment
(2-year lag)
Security
Assistance*Post
Leahy Law
Enactment
(1-year lag)
Security
Assistance*Post
Leahy Law
Enactment
(no lag)
Neighboring
Prosecutions
Treaties
Conflict
Democracy
Judicial
Independence
PTS
GDP
Population
Observations
Number of states

Model III

0.059

(0.037)
-0.005

-0.012

(0.036)
-0.059

(0.052)
-0.045

(0.033)
0.001

(0.042)
0.000

(0.044)
-0.000

(0.003)
0.239
(0.180)
-0.002
(0.031)
-0.003
(0.022)

(0.003)
0.267
(0.188)
0.004
(0.032)
-0.003
(0.022)

(0.003)
0.364
(0.191)
-0.015
(0.034)
-0.017
(0.024)

0.372
(0.553)
0.233**
(0.088)
0.224
(0.133)
-0.002
(0.796)

0.406
(0.563)
0.216*
(0.090)
0.216
(0.139)
-0.097
(0.813)

0.563
(0.627)
0.184
(0.102)
0.233
(0.150)
-0.239
(0.828)

2,243
134

2,135
133

1,958
128

Note: standard errors are clustered by
parentheses.* *p<0.01 and *p<0.05.
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VI. CONCLUSION

The DoS Leahy Law appears to have a positive effect on domestic
human rights prosecutions. These results also provide additional
empirical support to the arms for influence theory. Moreover,
prosecutorial activity alone may reduce human rights violations. For
instance, Sikkink and Kim have shown that domestic human rights
prosecutions lead to a decrease in human rights violations, even if they
do not result in convictions.8 9 Thus, the DoS Leahy Law may improve
human rights conditions as well. Therefore, these results stand in contrast
to prior empirical research on the relationship between U.S. foreign aid
and human rights. However, because the effect is small, the DoS Leahy
Law may not reduce as many human rights violations as desired by
human rights advocates.
Nonetheless, the Leahy Laws represent a balancing act of security
assistance and the promotion of human rights. Therefore, whether the
Leahy Laws should be improved to further reduce human rights
violations depends on the weight Congress and the President place on
human rights vis d vis security assistance. If Congress and the President
decided to give more weight to human rights, they could bring the DoD
Leahy Law in line with its DoS equivalent by making unit rehabilitation
contingent on countries taking effective measures to bring suspected
human rights abusers to justice. Another option would be for Congress,
or the President via executive order, to reduce the amount of future
security assistance for a country until it takes effective measures to bring
those identified as human rights abusers by the Leahy vetting process, to
justice.
Further research is warranted, however, before Congress makes
changes to the Leahy Laws. This Essay only provides evidence that the
DoS Leahy Law achieves one of its policy objectives and nothing more.
There are still many unanswered questions about the Leahy Laws. Do
they reduce U.S. complicity in human rights violations? Do the Leahy
Laws turn allies to seek assistance from U.S. adversaries? The answers
to these questions are important for Congress and the President to hone
the law.

89.

See Kim & Sikkink, supra note 68, at 87-88.
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